Tracy-Collins Trust Co. and Vilate P. Devine v. Marguerite Gessford Pierpont and Ella P. Meyer : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1959
Tracy-Collins Trust Co. and Vilate P. Devine v.
Marguerite Gessford Pierpont and Ella P. Meyer :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Warwick C. Lamoreaux; Allen Howe; Attorneys for Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Devine v. Pierpont, No. 9022 (Utah Supreme Court, 1959).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3302
Lv l ~ l 1959 
: • , 1 1.-•wi<.ARY 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FILED 
In the Matter of the Estate of THOMAS , 1 6 _ 
FAIRCLOUGH PIERPONT, 
n·e?Jea-sr<d - . ---------\...- .• ?<.:, '.:·::;;-~.-:-.... c rl-------------~ 
TRACY-COLLINS TRUST COMPANY, -. -~ ... -. ou 'Utah 
and VILATE P. DEVINE, Case No. 
Appellants, 9022 
-vs.-
MARGUERITE GESSFORD PIERPONT 
and ELLA P. MEYER, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, ELLA P. MEYER 
WARWICK C. LAMOREAUX, 
ALLEN HOWE, 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
Ella P. Meyer 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Pages 
STATEMENT OF CASE -------------------------------------------------------------- 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS------------------------------------------------------------ 2 
STATEMENT OF POINTS -------------------------------------------------------- 4 
ARGUMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 5 
POINT I. THE WILL AND THE LAW REQUIRE 
XFFIRMING THAT AN ANNUITY IN FAVOR 
OF MRS. MEYER VESTED AS OF THE TIME 
OF DECEDENT'S DEATH, NOT UPON DIS-
TRIBUTION ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 6 
POINT II. THE BEQUEST TO MRS. MEYER 
WAS IN THE TRUE NATURE OF AN ANNUITY ____ 31 
POINT III. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
FINDING INTEREST SHOULD BE PAID FROM 
DATE OF DEATH------------------------------------------------------------ 40 
CONCLUSION -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 46 
STATUTES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953: Sec'tion 74-3-1 ____________ 5, 8, 34 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1'953: Section 74-3-12 ________________ 5, 8 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953: 
Seotion 74-3-14 --------------------------------------------------------5, 9, 33, 35, 42 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953: 
Section 7 4-3-15 ------------------------------------------------5, 8, 41, 42, 44, 46 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953: Section 74-3-16 ---------------- 6 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953: Section 74-2-25 ________ 6, 9, 39 
REVISED STATUTES OF UTAH 1898, 2815 -------------------------- 33 
DEERINGS CALIFORNIA CODES, Probate, 
pages 315-333 ------------------------------------------------------------------11, 28, 42 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TEXTS 
Pages 
10 ANNO. CASES 339 ---------------------------------------------------··········-····-- 43 
BOUVIER'S LAW DICT ., RAWLE'S 3rd Ed. -----------·-···········22, 41 
JARMAN ON WILLS, 7th Ed., vol. 2, p. 1108 ·--·--···--··----·····-.42, 43 
150 A.L.R. 91 ---··--·---···-···-·······-········---·-·--·-------································· 19 
REST.A!TEMENT OF TRUSTS, 1st Ed., Sec. 234 ---·---··-----·---7, 12 
RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS, 2nd Ed., Sec. 234 .................... 45 
2 Am. J ur. 819 ····························--------------------------·----------················· 18 
2 Am. J ur. 829 .............................................................................. 18, 41 
AUTHORITIES CIT'ED 
CASES 
Eldredge v. Eldredge, 9 Cushing, (Mass.) 516 --------··········-···--·· 22 
Gaffer's E•state, 5 NYS 2d 671 ...................................................... 31-
In Re Hubbell's Es•tate, 15 P2d 503 ---···········-······------················-·· 43 
Ligbtenberg v. Burdell, 281 P 5118 ................................................ 19 
Parkhursts v. Ginn, 117 NE 202 ---·--·-················-·--·········-·········-22, 24 
In Re Lowe's Estate, 68 U 49, 249 P 128 .................................. 9, 44 
In Re Marre's Estate, 114 Pd 586 .......................... 14, 15, 36, 37, 44 
Murphy v. Crouse, 66 P 971 ······--------------·--··-------------···--·······-····· 20 
In Re Pittock's Will ........................................................................ 39 
In Re Platt's Estate 21 Cal. 2d 323, 131 P2d 825 .......... 2, 11, 33,44 
In Re Seal's' E1state, 55 P 83, 18 U 19 ·····--------------···-·········32, 36, 44 
In Re Watson's E1state, 90 P2d 349 .......................................... 11, 13 
Western Pac. Ry. v. Godfrey, 36 P 284 ........................................ 19 
Woodley v. Wood'ley, 117 P2d 722 ............................................ 17, 38 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of THOMAS 
FAIRCLOUGH PIERPONT, 
Deceased 
TRACY-COLLINS TRUST COMPANY, 
and VILATE P. DEVINE, 
Appellants, Case No. 
-vs.-
MARGUERITE GESSFORD PIERPONT 
and ELLA P. MEYER, 
Respondents. 
9022 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, ELLA P. MEYER 
STATEMENT OF THE GASE 
This is the brief of respondent, Ella P. Meyer only. 
She is the sister of the testator. (R. 278) Throughout 
'this entire proceeding, she has refused as best she could to 
become embroiled in a quarrel between the immediate 
family of the testator, and the respondent, Marguerite 
Gessford Pierpont. (R. 347, 364; Tr. 4, 22) Because of 
the peculiar grouping of paragraphs in her brother's will, 
Mrs. Meyer is caught in the family controversy. She de-
sires still to remain aloof, and simply state her case for 
recovery of an annuity provided her by Mr. Pierpont, a 
brother who clearly had taken care of her in the past, and 
intended to do so after his death. 
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Appellants' statement of the case is substantially 
correct, and we will not burden the court with restate-
ment, except to emphasize that this controversy has its 
origin in trustee, Tracy Collins Trust Co. petitioning the 
trial court for construction of the will. (R. 277) Mrs. 
Meyer appeared throughout the matter thereafter, and 
asserted her right to receive the annuity, and claimed 
interest thereon for arrears. (R. 346, 353; Tr. 6, 13, 20) 
She was granted judgment against the trustee for 
the sum of $3,713.16 down to the date the final decree 
bears. (R. 471) It is for that amount, plus her costs, and 
interest down to the date that sum is paid, for which she 
contends and for none other. 
The research of Mrs. Meyer's counsel has not been 
done in connection with or in any way associated with 
respondent, Marguerite Gessford Pierpont. The able 
brief of her counsel represents an independent work. We 
do not refer to cases there cited. We deem the most im-
portant foreign case to be found, cited in both respond-
ents' briefs, to be In re PLATT'S ESTATE, 131 P 2d 
825. We present our own independent approach and 
research. We come to the same answer. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Mrs. Meyer does not contest the facts as stated by 
appellants' brief. They are sufficiently accurate as to 
guide this court in its review. 
This only, as supplementary, must be added: On 
April 8, 1958, Mrs. Meyer was "78 years of age. Her 
health is poor. She is in desperate need of the annuity 
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Thomas Pierpont provided to be paid in his will." (R. 
363) "Mrs. Meyer is old and infirm. She needs the 
money her brother, the deceased, set up and provided for 
her. If there is further delay, it can have a bad effect 
on the health of Mrs. Meyer, and could hasten illness." 
(R. 347) 
At the hearing on June 30, 1958 before Judge Tuck-
ett, her counsel moved the court to continue the hearing 
in order to take testimony concerning testamentary in-
tent. There had just come to his attention that morning 
for the first time eighteen to twenty checks for $100 
each, two for $200 each, all in monthly payments, made 
by the testator immediately prior to his death, in her 
favor. Counsel preserved his record, asking that if the 
court deemed there was any ambiguity in the will, that 
the hearing be recessed or resumed to take testimony. 
(Tr. 6, 20.) The court found there was no ambiguity. (R. 
462) 
In his Findings, Conclusions and Decree, reference 
is made to these proffered checks and motion. Their 
import must not go unnoticed. (R. 462) 
Simply stated, Mrs. Meyer's claim is this: In para-
graph Seventh (i) of the will, and from the residuary 
estate, the testator made the following bequest: 
"From the income of the Trust Estate and, if 
insufficient, from the principal thereof, my 
Trustee, subject to the provisions of subpara-
graph (k) of this paragraph SEVENTH, shall 
make disbursements as follows: 
(2) To my sister ELLA P. MEYER the 
sum of One Hundred Dollars ( $100.00) 
per month during her lifetime." 
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Sub-paragraph sub- (k) reads: 
"(k) If, at any time the,income of the Trust 
Estate is insufficient to meet the payments re-
quired to be made by my Trustee, and principal 
funds are not available for such purposes, my 
Trustee may proportionately reduce the respec-
tive payments to be made to the extent required 
by the availability of funds; and if necessary, 
may suspend further payments until funds be-
come available through income of the Trust Es-
tate or through orderly sale of all or part of the 
principal assets. In the event any payments 
specified to be made by my Trustee shall be so 
reduced or suspended, it is my desire that when 
funds become available, any so resulting defici-
encies in monthly payments shall be made up. It 
is my desire and instruction that my Trustee shall 
not sell principal assets at a sacrifice in order to 
obtain funds to meet the payments specified in 
this will. But it is my desire that when, if and as 
required, prinicpal assets shall be converted into 
cash or readily salesable securities in order to 
enable the Trustee to make the payments speci-
fied hereunder, provided that sale of principal 
assets can, in the sole judgment and discretion of 
the Trustee, be made at a price and in a manner 
consistent with sound business judgment." 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE WILL AND THE LAW REQUIRE AFFIRMING 
THAT AN ANNUITY IN FAVOR OF MRS. MEYER VESTED 
AS OF THE TIME OF DECEDENT'S DEATH, NOT UPON 
DISTRIBUTION. 
POINT II 
THE BEQUEST TO MRS. MEYER WAS IN THE TRUE 
NA'TURE OF AN ANNUITY. 
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POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING INTEREST 
SHOULD BE PAID FROM DATE OF DEATH. 
ARGUMENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF STATUTES: 
The following statutory provisions are crucial in the 
disposition of this case. They are all found in Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 : 
74-3-1. CLASSIFICATION OF LEGACIES: AN-
NUITIES: 
"Legacies are distinguished and designated, 
according to their nature as follows : 
(3) An annuity is a bequest of certain speci-
fied sums, periodically ; if the fund or 
property out of which they are payable 
fails, resort may be had to the general 
assets as in a case of a general legacy." 
74-3-12. WHEN BEQUEST OF INCOME AC-
CRUES: 
"In case of a bequest of the interest or in-
come of a certain sum or fund, the income accrues 
from the testa;tor' s death." 
74-3-14. LEGACIES AND ANNUITIES-WHEN 
DUE: 
"Legacies are due and deliverable at the ex-
piration of one year after the testator's decease. 
Annu~ties commence at the testator's dece,ase.'' 
74-3-15. INTEREST ON LEGACIES: 
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"Legacies bear interest from the time when 
they are due and payable, except that legacies for 
maintenance, or to the testator's widow, bear in-
terest from the testator's decease.'' 
74-3-16. INTENT GOVERNS FOUR PRECED-
ING SECTIONS: 
"The four preceding sections are in all cases 
to be controlled by a testator's express intention." 
74-2-25. DISPOSITIONS. VESTING. PRESUMP-
TIONS: 
"Testamentary dispositions, including devises 
and bequests to a person on attaining majorty, 
are presumed to vest at the testator's death.'' 
COMMENT ON APPELLANTS' BRIEF: 
We do not intend to advert to all of the specious 
arguments in appellants' brief but will only argue the 
important points. By not referring to the numerous mis-
statements and false conclusions, let it not be implied 
that we agree with their position, for we do not in any 
degree. Brevity requires we aim for the mark, and supply 
authority. That they have not done. 
POINT I 
THE WILL AND THE LAW REQUIRE AFFIRMING 
THAT AN ANNUITY IN FAVOR OF MRS. MEYER VESTED 
AS OF THE TIME OF DECEDENT'S DEATH, NOT UPON 
DISTRIBUTION. 
The judgment that should be affirmed found that 
the trust provisions of the will, paragraph Seventh, (i) 
"in connection with all other provisions of the will to 
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be in the nature of annuities, and such, said annuities 
are to be paid by the trustee commencing at the date 
of the death of the deceased ... " (R. 468, 470) 
Thus, the crucial issue, as stated by appellants at 
page 13 of their brief, is a question of the time when 
the annuitant Mrs. Meyer's legacy took effect. Without 
citing a single case as authority, counsel argue this 
time should be upon distribution, not as stated in the 
Utah statutes, upon death of the testator. 
RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS: 
The learned trial judge found his answer In the 
statute, after finding Mrs. Meyer had been given an 
annuity under the will. If her bequest is in the nature 
of an annuity, then 7 4-3-14 UCA 1953 is controlling, for 
it says: "Annuities commence at the testator's decease," 
and it does not say at distribution. The trial judge also 
predicated his decision on "An examination of the cases 
and the RESTATEMENT of the Law of TRUSTS," 
section 234 thereof being applicable. A partial statement 
there is: 
"a. Where a trust is created by will and by 
the terms of the trust the income is payable to 
a beneficiary for a designated period, the bene-
ficiary is entitled to income from the date of the 
death of the testator, unless it is otherwise pro-
vided in the will." 
The will created a trust to pay Mrs. Meyer $100 per 
month "during her life," not for a portion thereof re-
maining after administration and distribution. She fits 
the cloth of the Restatement and the statute, exactly. 
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UTAH STATUTES: 
Furthermore, note the additional statutes that bear 
on this question of time: 
1. "An annuity is a bequest of certain specified 
sums periodically; if the fund or property out of which 
they are payable fails, resort may be had to the general 
assets as in case of a general legacy." 74-3-1 (3) Mrs. 
Meyer fits this definition: the sum is certain. She gets 
by the will, first from income, but if insufficient, 7 (i) 
instructs the trustee to invade principal. This comports 
with the vesting statute quoted. Furthermore, that the 
testator instructed delay in payments if sacrifice was 
involved, said payments shall be made up as in sub-(k) 
does not alter the nature of the annuity. There can be 
no escape from the character of the legacy as being in 
the full nature of .an annuity. 
2. 74-3-12 UCA 1953 says: "In case of a bequest of 
the interest or income of a certain sum or fund, the 
income accrues from the testator's death." The Testator 
in 7 (i) said: "From the income of a trust estate ... " 
which puts this legacy in a second statutory instruction 
to pay from the date of death. Ordinarily in the cases, 
the provision would reach an indeterminate sum that 
would be earned as income from the corpus of the trust, 
and in that unspecified amount situation, still the an-
nuity would accrue at testator's death. How much more 
it should apply in the case of a "specified sum periodi-
cally" of $100 per month during her life! 
3. 74-3-15 UCA. 1953 says that "Legacies bear in-
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terest from the time when they are due and payable, 
except that legacies for maintenance, or to the testator's 
widow, bear interest from the testator's decease." The 
Utah Legislature has vested a right in Mrs. Meyer to 
collect interest from the time section 74-3-14 says the 
money is due, to wit, "Annuities commence at the testa-
tor's death." Also, if that is not enough statutory au-
thority, the same interest statute says if the legacies are 
for maintenance, and this is just that, interest shall 
accrue at testator's decease. 
CASE LAW: 
It is indeed rare that so much statutory authority is 
found to evaporate appellants' specious argument. He 
did not cite a pertinent case on the subject. That should 
show that the statutes of Utah have been so clear that 
no reason existed for this court to construe such plain, 
unambiguous requirements. 
Counsel, finding no law to support them, argues in 
brief the intention of the testator. We will stick with the 
law and show that the cases throughout the land are 
against appellants' position, and will confirm this court 
in affirming the lower court. 
The closest Utah authority on the subject is In Re 
LOWE'S ESTATE, 68 Utah 49, 249 P 128. Eminent 
counsel argued, and the court laid down the basic prin-
ciples that must be applied in this case, or the Lowe 
case will be materially weakened, changed. In 1926 this 
court construed the statute now found at 7 4-2-25 UCA 
1953, then saying : 
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" ... section 6371, Compiled Laws 1917, which 
declares that all testamentary dispositions are 
presumed to vest at the testator's death, and from 
the fact that there is nothing in the will to indicate 
an intention on the part of the testatrix that the 
vesting of the bequests and devises made therein 
should be postponed beyond her death. We regard 
this language as a direction or command from the 
testatrix to the trustee, whom she had selected, 
to divest itself of the title to the trust property, 
which she knew would vest in her trustee at the 
moment of her death ... We are therefore of the 
opinion that Mrs. Hampton had the right and 
power under this will at any time after the death 
of her mother, either before or after there had 
been distribution of the property in the probate 
proceedings, to remove Bankers' Trust Co. from 
its trusteeship and to name in its stead Walker 
Bros ... " p. 133 (emphasis added) 
The case squarely shows that the bequest to 1\{rs. 
Meyer vested at the date of death of Mr. Pierpont. If 
this court promulgates the doctrines asked for by the 
appellants, it must do so on no other grounds than a 
reversal of the Lowe's Estate case. The testamentary 
intent is clear in both cases. At bar, section 7 (i) is 
mandatory, using the words "shall make disbursement ... 
to my sister Ella P. Meyer ... during her lifetime." The 
best appellants can wheedle out is that in the subsequent 
admonition in 7 (k) there might be a suspension for 
avoidance of sacrificing values. More on this later. 
The prime determination for this court is to find 
whether or not a bequest "in the nature of an annuity" 
vests at the time of testator's death, or sometime later, 
at distribution of the residuary estate. This court said 
it was bound by the Utah statutes, in the Lowe case, to 
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find the vesting occurred .at death, not at distribution, 
and the same finding must be made now. All of the other 
apposite statutes drive to the same result. 
We have searched long and hard to find something 
squarely in pofut, and have finally discovered .a strong 
decisive case is California by its highest court. We have 
a right and duty to advert to that state because it was 
the source of our own statutes on the subject. Please 
refer to DEERINGS CALIFORNIA CODES, Probate, 
from pages 315 to 333. The history of that state's enact-
ments will show that .all of Utah's enactments pertinent 
were identical, historically. California has since codified 
many of its leading decisions, and the same are shown, 
with history, beginning at page 333 of that citation. 
Utah follows California statutes that are identical! 
In our research for apposite cases, among many, we 
finally found a District Court of appeal case in Cali-
fornia that appellants might have found and used. It 
determined the issue favorable to appellants that the 
annuity vested only at distribution, and not at death, the 
case being IN RE \VATSON'S ESTATE, 90 P 2d 349. 
However, Sheppard gave the answer in the subsequent 
case of In Re PLATT'S ESTATE, 131 P 2d 825, 1942 
therein expressly disapproving the Watson decision. 
The Platt decision must be regarded as the leading case 
in that jurisdiction, and for any state having the same 
statutory enactments. It cleans out a great deal of in-
decision and conflict, summarily, on facts very similar 
to the case at bar. 
In the Platt case, testator likewise left personal 
property to his widow and son ; then remainder to a 
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trustee with directions to pay the widow from the income 
of corpus $250 per month until her remarriage. If the 
income exceeded that amount, the son came in for a 
monthly annuity, with more facts not important. The son 
was substantially to get what was left after interim gifts 
to his mother, the widow. Problems arose in administra-
tion as to the time these annuities accrued, the widow 
contending payment accrued as of date of death of testa-
tor, the son arguing the date of distribution was the 
vesting date. The Trustee, as in the case at bar, asked 
the court for instructions, and the lower court found as 
Tracy -Collins and Mrs. Devine contend here. In Re 
Watson, supra would be a specious authority for the 
position taken by the son there and appellants here but 
for subsequent debasement. The Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia decided once and for all, the date of death of 
the testator vested the rights, not the date of distribu-
tion\ lit ~reversed the lower courts with an excellent 
rational and review of the authorities to guide them out 
of the mire! It cites section 234 of the RESTATEMENT 
OF TRUSTS with approval, in consonance with the 
research of Judge Tuckett. Here are some quotations : 
"Unquestionably the rule of the restatement 
is based upon sound reasoning. As title to all 
testamentary dispositions vests at the testator's 
death . . . (codes) the title of the trustee Mr. 
Platt's property (testator) vested as of that date 
even though the trust estate was residuary in 
character. (many cases) As a necessary corollary, 
the title of the life tenant (the mother, widow) 
also dates from the death of the testator." ... 
"But in California there is a statutory rule 
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which is determinative of the question raised by 
the wife's appeal. Section 160 of the Probate 
Code" (and this is identical with 7 4-3-12 of the 
Utah ·Code) "provides that 'In case of a bequest 
of the interest or income of a certain sum or fund, 
the income accrues from the testator's death' 
although this provision is controlled by a testa-
tor's express intention. If, therefore, the income 
payable to Mrs. Platt is a 'bequest of ... income 
of a certain sum of fund' and the testator did not 
express a contrary intention, her right to income 
from the trust estate accrued at the date of her 
husband's death. 
"A bequest is 'a gift by will of personal prop-
erty; a legacy. It is well settled that testamentary 
gifts of trust income are 'bequests' (cases) ... 
"So as there is no express provision in the 
will as to the date from which payment of income 
shall accrue, under section 160 of the Probate 
Code the rights of both the wife and son to income 
under the trust accrue from the date of the testa-
tor's death." 
The language of the court, referring to the confusion 
in California appears at page 827 of 131 P2 as follows: 
"The appellate courts of California have not 
been consistent in deciding whether payment of 
income from a testamentary trust accrues from 
the date of the testator's death or from the date 
of distribution of the estate to the trustee. In a 
majority of cases it has been held that, unless 
the testamentary trust was created for the sup-
port or maintenance of the beneficiary, the in-
come accrues from the date of distribution." 
(cases, including In re Est. Of Watson, 90 P2d 
349.)" 
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"Apparently the controlling factor in the de-
cision of these cases was the inability of the 
beneficiary to compel the payment of any income 
prior to the distribution of the trust property to 
the trustees. That fact, however, is not determina-
tive of the question for, as has been recently 
stated, the rule which precludes a beneficiary 
from suing to recover income during the period of 
administration relates only to the tiine at which 
the trustees may be compelled to make payment, 
and does not determine the date at which the right 
to income commences. In re Estate of Marre, 114 
P2d 586." 
So here we have the whole case in a nut shell, decided 
in the highest court in California, over-ruling an erron-
eous line of prior authority, with a rational that must 
be followed here because our statutes are the same, and 
the logic is identical, to say nothing of the precedent of 
the Lowe case decided by this court. 
In thinking about the second paragraph above quoted 
from the Platt case, in respect to the right of the annui-
tant to compel payment ahead of distribution, let us 
make reference to the case quoted above: In re Estate 
of MARRE, 114 P2d 586, in connection with appellants' 
argument before and after page 30 of their brief. They 
there fall into the confusion of the lower California 
courts. Appellants argue that during probate, and while 
the Pierpont properties are being judiciously sold, and 
not at a sacrifice, that respondents could not have com-
pelled payment, "forced a sale of the trust assets." The 
Platt decision, refers to In re Marre 's, supra, and the 
latter decision, by the same court, said: 
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"It is true that during the administration of 
the estate, and prior to distribution of the trust 
property to appellatns, the beneficiary could not 
have brought action to compel against either the 
trustees or the exectuors of the estate. (cases) 
The executors were under no duty to make pay-
ments and the trustees could not be compelled to 
make payments prior to the distribution of the 
trust property to them. The beneficiary's remedy 
during that period is confined to asking the pro-
bate court to distribute a portion of the trust 
funds to the trustee to be used for his support. 
(cases) The rule preventing suit during this per-
iod relates to the time at which the trustees may 
be compelled to make actual payment, however, 
rather than to the date at which the right to sup-
port commenced. This, after the property was 
distributed to the trustees, payment should have 
been made for the respondent's support and main-
tenance commencing from the date of testatrix' 
death." P. 590 
We refer this court to the earlier portion of this 
excellent Marre's decision, respecting testamentary in-
tent and maintenance, this for the reason that in the 
record, it is must be remembered that Judge Tuckett 
had proferred to him 20 checks in favor of Mrs. Meyer, 
immediately prior to testator's death, showing he had 
maintained and supported her. (R. 469, 462, Tr. 20) 
Keeping that proffer in mind, note the highest court of 
California at page 589 of 114 P2d. 
"The absence of an express direction that the 
payments were to accrue from the date of her 
death does not establish conclusively, however, 
that the testatrix had no such intent. The inten-
tion of the testator is the determining factor 
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(code) and that intent is to be gathered from the 
instrument as a whole. (code, cases) The terms of 
the will clearly indicate that this trust was created 
for the specific purpose of providing maintenance 
and support for the testatrix' grandson, the bene-
ficiary herein. Indeed, if the will itself did not 
refer to this bequest as a trust for maintenance 
and support, the surrounding facts and circum-
stances would compel that conclusion. (case) The 
evidence shows that respondent was the grandson 
of the testatrix, that he had been supported by 
her, and that she had definite plans for his future 
education. Respondent was a minor at the date 
of the execution of the will and at the date of the 
testatrix' death, and this trust is the only provi-
sion made for the respondent in the will. Under 
like circumstances it has been held that the pay-
ments under such a trust for support and main-
tenance were intended to accrue from the date of 
testator's death. In Estate of Dare, 235 P 725, 
729 this court stated the rule which we think 
governs the present case; 'B~~ both reason and 
authority we are compelled to the conclusion that 
the respondent's right to the income to be derived 
from the trust properties must be held to have 
relation to the death of the testatrix. As to the 
reason of the situation, it would seem to follow 
that if, as we hold, the provision in said will and 
in the trust clauses thereof were intended by the 
testatrix to be in the nature of bequests for the 
maintenance of her adopted daughter who, as has 
been shown-had theretofore been supported and 
maintained by her adopting parents during their 
lifetime, such intention ought to have relation to 
a time from and after the death of the testatrix, 
since by that means only could continuity of such 
rnaintenance be assured!" 
Please note the decision in that case follows with a dis-
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cussion of when interest on the sum begins. Supported 
by strong authority in New York and Massachusetts, the 
California court says interest accrues as of the date of 
death, and not of distribution. It has been codified in 
California, as well as in Utah! 
It is a little difficult, to say the least, for us to see 
the pertinance of appellants' reference to WOODLEY v. 
WOODLEY, 117 P2 722. In that case "there is no trust 
involved, but the rights of the parties rests upon an 
"equitable charge." That case is in the lower appellate 
court of California and the problems are not pertinent. 
It seems amazing that appellants' brief does not come to 
the issue, in the face of such overwhelming a,uthority. 
Even this case finds an equitable charge on land passing 
by will, subject to an obligation to pay $50 per month 
during annuitant's lifetime. And it appears the rule was 
followed that the right to receive accrued as of the date 
of death! Appellants here do not sight a single authority, 
Utah or otherwise, to show strength to their unsupport-
able argument. 
The PLATT and MARRE'S estate cases, supra, are 
a full and complete refutation to the claims of appellants, 
and fully support Judge Tuckett for affirmation. This 
court must follow those cases to be consistent with In 
re LOWE'S ESTATE, supra, its own decision since 
1926, that ought not to be altered without good reason. 
These California decisions should be consulted on 
the argument as to whether or not the bequests are in 
the nature of annuities. Mr. Pierpont admonished the 
trustee not to sell assets at a sacrifice. This did not make 
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precatory the mandatory vesting of the rights of Mrs. 
Meyer under section 7 (i). (R. 14) But the rights vested, 
subject to administration, marshalling the fund, with the 
instruction that if any amounts were reduced or sus-
pended during liquidation, "any so resulting deficiencies 
in monthly payments shall be made up." (R. 15) Mrs. 
Meyer is one of those monthly annuitants. She did not 
object to orderly liquidation, nor avoidance of quick 
sale to take care of her. She patiently waited as her 
brother asked that she do. And when the estate, rather 
large, (R. 201) was in a position to be advantageously 
distributed, her rights related back by statute, and by 
the strongest of court decisions, to the date of Mr. Pier-
pont's death. The failure of appellants to produce a 
single case to the contrary is revealing of the paucity. 
2 Am. J ur. 819, #4 states, as to vesting: 
"If by the terms of the will, the sum given 
is payable in stated installments at definite per-
iods in the future, the postponement of the pay-
ment is presumed to be for the benefit of the 
legatee, and the bequest VESTS immediately 
upon the death of the testator. Therefor, the death 
of the legatee at any time thereafter will not de-
feat the right of his administrator to recover the 
entire sum bequeathed. 
Also in 2 Am. J ur. 829, #24, that authority states 
concerning time of accrual of payment: 
"Likewise, where an annuity is given by will, 
it begins to run from the death of the testator; 
and ordinarily, the first yearly payment is not 
due until the end of a year from the death, unless 
there are circumstances or expressions in the will 
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evidencing a different intention. If the annuity 
is directed to be paid monthly, the first monthly 
payment will be payable at the expiration of a 
month after the testator's death." 
In 1913 the California court held in WESTERN 
PAC. RY. v. GOD·FREY, 36 P. 284: 
"That the estate of a decedent vests in his 
heir or devisees and legatees immediately upon 
his death cannot be disputed ... 
"Pending the administration the personal 
representatives of the decedent are entitled to the 
possession of the estate for the purposes of ad-
ministration, but the title vests in the heirs or 
devisees and legatees, subject only to the right of 
possession of the personal representatives of the 
decedent ... 
"The legatee does not derive title from the 
decree of distribution, but from the will, which 
takes effect immediately upon the death of the 
testator. The decree of distribution does not 
create the title. It merely declares the title that 
accrued under by the will." 
To the same effect is the California case of LIGHT-
ENBERG v. BURDELL, 281 P 518 at 525, 1929, quoting 
and applying the same language. 
The theory of appellants in their brief is that title 
and rights to the monthly allowance to Mrs. Meyer did 
not vest or accrue until after distribution; that in the 
interim the property was vested in the executor, free of 
obligation to Mrs. Meyer. At common law, this might be 
true; but Utah and California have adopted a different 
rule. Note the language of an annotation at 150 ALR 91: 
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"Under the common-law doctrine title to per-
sonal property of a testator's estate generally 
vests in the executor upon his appointment, and 
he has the absolute right to dispose of :· · . In 
some jurisdiction, however, as for example, Cali-
fornia, both real and personal property generally 
descend directly to the beneficiary, with a quali-
fied right in the personal representative, who 
holds it for the purposes of administration more 
like a receiver than like a common-law executor. 
The title is not in him, nor has he the power of 
disposal, save by order of the court." 
The annotation then cites MURPHY v. CROUSE, 66 
P 971, 972. That case enunciates the doctrine quoted, and 
it is clearly in point here. The appellants in this case 
held all of the testator's property, first as executor, and 
then as residuary legatee in connection with trust powers. 
It is in the latter that Mrs. Meyer is entitled to take 
her annuity. In what capacity did Tracy-Collins Trust 
Co. hold said property: with common-law powers with 
an "absolute right to dispose of it" or "with a qualified 
right . . . for the purposes of administration more like 
a receiver than a common-law executor~" In the Murphy 
case, supra, the highest court of California held in 1901 
that: 
"The rule never prevailed in this state. Here 
both real and personal property descend directly 
to the heir, or to the beneficiary named in the will 
with a qualified right in the personal representa-
tive, who holds it for the purposes of administra-
tion more like a receiver than like a common-law 
executor. The title is not in him, nor has he the 
power of disposal, save by order of the court. 
This has been for almost a century the rule in Cali-
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fornia, and Utah has picked up the basic·California prac-
tice. The Utah statute disposes of the question entirely if 
the payments to Mrs. Meyer are in the nature of an an-
nuity. That we will discuss later under an appropriate 
head. Assuming the payments to be .an annuity, and it is, 
the statute puts Tracy-Collins Trust Co. in exactly the 
status as the California court declares: that comparable 
to a receiver, "with a qualified right" to administer. 
Certainly the long list of duties enumerated by counsel 
at page 14 of their brief shows the nature of receivership 
functions. In a large estate such as the testators' these 
marshalling functions had to be accomplished, as he fore-
saw, and made provisions for. And by so functioning, 
the trust company status does not shift. The testator 
willed that caution be exercised in converting the estate 
in to a condition to make distribution. He provided that 
no haste be employed in selling, converting. But he 
showed his clear intention to have the trustee function 
according to the Utah statute; and if payments to Mrs. 
Meyer were "reduced or suspended, it is my desire that 
when funds become available, any so resulting deficiencies 
in monthly payments shall be made up.'' (R. 15) How 
could the testator have been more explicit in showing that 
it was "$100 per month during her lifetime" that should 
be paid to Mrs. Meyer~ (R. 14) Note there are but two 
provisions in the long will for monthly payments. Mrs. 
Meyer gets one of these. 
The right of Tracy-Collins to convert the estate into 
cash so as to meet the annuity payment requirements 
is kin to receivership. The right to receive $100 per month 
during her lifetime vested in Mrs. Meyer at the time of 
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testator's death, subject only to the orderly instructions 
not to "sacrifice in order to obtain funds." He even goes 
further and instructs the trustee to invade principal if 
income is insufficient to meet the monthly schedule dur-
ing the lifetime of Mrs. Meyer. (R.14) 
Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Rawle's 3rd Ed. under 
"Legacy" at page 1905 treats the question of whether 
and when the legacy vests. Several authorities are cited 
there, among the old Massachusetts case of Eldridge v. 
Eldredge, 1852, 9 Cushings 516, saying: 
"If the time of payment merely be postponed, 
and it appear to be the intention of the testator 
that his bounty should immediately attach, the 
legacy is of the vested kind; ... " 
It is clear here that Mrs. Meyer's legacy was to be "dur-
ing her life time.'' 
This could never be honorably construed to mean on a 
contingency or at some future time during her life time. 
SUSPENSION OF PAY11:ENT OF MON'THLY SUMS: 
It is implicated in the will that the testator instruc-
ted the trustee to husband 1the assets and only sell when 
no sacrifice of value would deplete the estate. Para. 7 (k) 
of the will. (R. 15) This provision does not divest Mrs. 
Meyer of her legacy, annuity. It expressly is reserved 
that if the mothly sum is proportionately reduced or 
suspended, "it is my desire that when funds become 
available, any so resulting deficiencies in monthly pay-
ments shall be made up.'' The Massachussets court 
cons1trued a complicated publisher's will in PARK-
I-IURT.S v. GINN, 117 NE 202 ,at 207 and stated: 
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'' ... it is plain that the purpose of the testator 
was to give 1to her something to add to her enjoy-
ment of life and not merely to constitute a fund 
for the benefit of her heirs or legatees ... The 
crucial words of gift so far as concerns time is 
in effect that these legacies shall be payable 
only .after the·re is an adequate reserve to support 
the payment of all annuities and gifts of in-
come ... " 
Apply the same rule of reason to Mr. Pierpont, and 
it is clear that he intended and provided for one of hi~ 
two only full sisters "$100 per month during her life-
time." She could not enjoy it after she was dead. It 
would cease. If it were nuuecessarily with-held from 
her during administration, she could no1t enjoy it or live 
on it ''during her lifetime.'' The testator expressly 
required that the trustee, in so husbanding 'the assets, 
to make up any reduced or suspended monthly payment, 
and not as appellants argue, denude her, expropriate 
her, or destroy her annui1ty! What .are the crucial words 
of "time'' in Pierp·ont's will~ 
Let it be remembered that there were only two sisters 
of the tes1tator. Note the way in which he took care of 
Florence P. Taggart. (Para. 3, sub. (g) page 1) of the 
will: he gave a specific, cash sum of $1000 to her, pro-
vided that if Mrs. Tagg.art be not living ''on the date 
of distribu1tion of my estate then in that event said 
legacy shall lapse and my executor shall disburse the 
said sum of $1000 to Alice Taggart, my niece." (R. 11) 
The record does not disclose the entire family picture of 
the sisters, Mrs Taggart, bu1t it is cle.ar that the testator 
was aware of time to be consumed in administration, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
and wanted to be sure that either the sister, Florence 
P. Taggart, or his favorite niece by her, be taken care 
of. The treatment of Mrs. Meyer, the only other full 
sister, must be considered .alongside. In her .Answer to 
Petition for rehearing (R. 366) she shows that "She 
is 78 years of age. Her health is poor. She is in desper-
ate need of the annuity ... " .Also in her Protest 
respecting rehearing, at page 347 of the record, she 
states : ''Mrs. Meyer is old and infirm. She needs the 
money her brother, the deceased, set up and provided 
for her.'' These allegations were never answered nor 
disputed on the record, and s'tands admitted for purpose 
of this hearing. She is now 79. Obviously her health 
could not have been improved at her age. That she was 
provided for by a loving brother in his will, and that 
the appellants have obstructed her receipt 'Of sums willed 
to her amounting to over $3,600.00 for more than five 
years now, is cause for this court to find that her condi-
tion has worsened, and that the delay would further 
make her ill. The language in PARKHURST v. GINN 
supra quoted is re.al. The $3,600.00 should not be so 
long delayed in coming as to only benefit her estate 
and children. It was the aged and ailing sister, Mrs. 
Meyer, that Pierpont clearly wanted to benefit, and that 
''during her lifetime'' and not too long delayed, without 
making up the deficit! Mr. Pierpont theoretically pr~­
ferred Mrs. Meyer to her sister, Mrs. Taggart, for Mrs. 
Meyer would only have to live for 10 months to have 
the equivalent of the sister, Mrs. Taggart. It does not 
lie for the appellants, nor this court, to change the 
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expressed intention of the testator, to take c.are of Mrs. 
Meyer during her lifetime. 
THE PROF'ERRED EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF IN-
TENT: 
The testa!tor took care of her prior to his death. 
This cannot be disputed. Mrs. Meyer's counsel moved 
the court at the time of the last hearing as follows: 
''I move the court to continue this hearing 
in order that testimony be taken, respecting testa-
mentary intent . . . I would like 1the record to 
show that there has been shorwn to me this morn-
ing for the first time some eighteen or twenty 
checks, signed by Mr. Thomas Pierpon1t in favor 
of Ella Meyer, most of them are a hundred 
dollars; there are two or three that are two 
hundred dollars - immediately preceeding his 
death, and they followed in monthly sequence, and 
will show a testamen1tary intent ... I feel that 
the court ought to have before it any extraneous 
evidence, outside of the widow, that would point 
to 'this. And I would like to have the court take 
that into account in the disposition of this case. 
I would be glad to not make any argument until 
such time as there is a little more evidence before 
the court. But I think all parties intended t'O 
address themselves directly to the m.ai:Jters of law, 
and I did not understand it was to take testimony. 
I asked Mr. Gibbons if he would stipulate with 
me this morning for the introduction 'Of these 
checks into the record, .and he stated he felt he 
would not be able to so do. So my 'Only recourse 
is io make the motion which I have made. 
THE COURT: Well, unless there is an ambi-
guity in the Will, can the court receive extrinsic 
testimony~ 
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MR. LAMOREAUX: I understand, unless 
there is an ambiguity, can the Court receive ex-
trinsic ~testimony 1 Is that your question 1 I believe 
that is the fact. I believe that is a correct state-
ment, and I must preserve my right if the matter 
should go on appeal. If the court deems there 
is an ambiguity, I want an opportunity to pre-
sent considerable extrinsic testimony. 
Mr. GIBBONS: Your Honor, in that respect, 
may I inquire whether it is the intention of Mr. 
Lamoreaux if this Will is ambiguous on its face~ 
MR. LAMOREAUX: No, I do not believe 
that. But I think the argument you have made, 
Mr. Gibbons, introduced an element of ambiguity 
which I am wholly unprepared to rebut. But I 
don't leaveit exclusively on matter of .argument. 
I am prepared to presen't evidence if the court 
believes there is an ambiguity ... 
THE COURT: Well, the Court might say 
this: If the court determines there is an ambi-
guity, I assume that the eourt will permit you to 
put on testimony. 
MR. LAMOREAUX: That will be satisfac-
tory with me, Your Honor." (Tr. 20) 
The court took the n1atter, after long argument, 
under advisement for the second tilne under the rehear-
ing. It received authorities. In entering its final Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, i1t referred ex-
pressly to the 1notion of l\[r. Lamoreaux, and the proffer 
of the several checks. (R. 462. 469) The court in effect 
found there was no .an1biguity within the ·w-ill. It express-
ly found: 
''That 'the said will becmne effective as of 
the date of the death of the testator and that the 
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trust provisions and the will became effective as 
of that date. That there is nothing in the will 
to indicated that the testator intended to postpone 
the payments provided for in Paragraph Seventh 
(i) of the will untill the estate was distributed 
to the trustee." (R. 470) 
There was and is no ambiguity as to Mrs. Meyer. 
The offer of the checks amply saves the record, and :this 
court must take into account that proffered evidence as 
proving that the testator had practiced the annui1ty prin-
ciple with Mrs. Meyer for 18 months prior to his death, 
and that he in1tended to so continue it after his death. 
The checks are exceilent extrinsic evidence of a testa-
mentary intent, and certainly confirm the clear interpre-
tation given of 'the will, so far as Mrs. Meyer is con-
cerned, of Judge Tuckett's finding there was clear intent 
for the gift to take efefct as ofthe date of death. As 
Mrs. Meyer's counsel advised the court, 
''But if there is ,any question of testamen1tary 
intent, the matter could be set down to hear 
those things . . . Bu1t I still feel that the matter 
should be handled as a matter of law, and could 
well be." (Tr. 6) 
Mr. Gibbons stated: 
" ... the provisions of Mr. Pierpont's Will are 
clear and unambiguous, and that his intention, 
therefore, is to be determined from the Will itself. 
For that reason, it is not contemplated by us that 
we will introduce any evidence in this matter.'' 
(Tr. 5) 
The record was made without extrinsic exidence except 
such as proffered by Mrs. Meyer's counsel. The argu-
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ment and decision was made on the will itself, and that 
rightly. Only if this court holds there is ambiguity that 
might be cleared by extrinsic testimony, should the de-
cision of the lower court be disturbed. Appellants at 
no time suggested they had any extrinsic evidence. The 
only offer is that of Mrs. Meyer in confirmation of the 
interpretation given by the court. We do not wish to 
open the record for further testimony. But if the court 
has any re.al doubt that would upset the decision of the 
lower court, then Mrs. Meyer has adequately preserved 
her standing to bring extrinsic evidence to bear on testa-
mentary in:tent, not otherwise. 
STATUTORY HISTORY: 
The sections of the Utah statute declaring "Legacies 
are due .and deliverable at the expiration of one year 
after the testator's decease. Annuities commence at the 
testator's death,'' were taken verba tum from the Cali-
fornia statute. The legislative history of that statute is 
st.ated in Deering's California Codes, Probate, page 333 
at No. 162. The California legistlature changed the old 
section that read precisely as does the Utah statute, so 
as to become more explicit as to ,,~hen annuities are 
vested. Note how the addition for clarity is added, shown 
here in italics: 
"162 . . . Annuities commence at the testa-
tor's death and are due at the end of the annual, 
monthly or other specified pedod." 
The California statue then goes on in the same para-
graph, showing that even though there be a trust created 
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by will, such as the trust in the case at bar, nevertheless, 
interest is to accrue on each .anniversary of the dece-
dent's death. This demonstrates the fallacy of appelants' 
argument. California ·codified the practice and sound 
policy on which the Utah statue w.as founded. Here is 
the language that follows the quoted portion immediately 
above: 
"162 ... Whenever an annuitant, legatee of 
a legacy for maintenance or benefiJdary of a t.rust 
may be entitled to periodic payments or trust 
income commencing at the testator's death, he 
shall be entitled to interest at 4% per annum on 
the amount of any unpaid .accumulations of such 
payments or income held by the executor or 
administrator on each anniversary of the dece-
dent ''s death, computed from the date of such 
anniversary." (emphasis added) 
California like Utah vests the annuity at the time 
of testator's death. There is no question about that. 
Counsel in appellant's brief makes the specious, untrue 
statement at page 18 of their brief : ''The trust estate 
did not come into existence until the testator's residual 
estate was distributed to the trustee on October 18, 1957. '' 
This statement is simply not true. In paragraph Seventh 
of the will the testator set up the terms of the trust that 
included all property ''in which I may be interested at 
the time of my death . . . '' The trustee was also the 
executor, possessed of full po.-wer over all of the estate, 
trust or otherwise. Under the terms of the amended, fuller 
and more explicit California statute .above, the trust has 
nothing to do with fixing the time when the right to the 
annuity vests. This is codifying of the rule of law that 
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has been followed through the land and in England, and 
to postpone such a vesting date would not only violate 
the Utah statute but it would do violence to the clear 
testamentary intent of Mr. Pierpont, to say nothing of 
establishing a rule of law pregnant with possibilities for 
abuse by executors that could devour an estate before 
trust by time, expenses, wido·w's allowance, and other 
devises. 
As it is, the executor took three years to reduce 
the estate to a form in which it chose to present the trust 
aspects to the lower court. (R. 273) It is well to examine 
appellants ''Enclosure A'' and the arguments at page 23 
of the brief. Suppose they had taken rightfully or 
wrongfully as many as eight years to marshal and con-
vert the estate for distribution, what could and would 
have happened to the elderly sister of the testator, Mrs. 
Meyer, during that time~ She could have died of star-
vation, but her loving brother had other ideas. He stated 
clearly that she should receive $100.00 per month during 
her lifetime.'' True it is that the testator was prudent 
in instructing the executor to ''suspend further pay-
ments until funds become available ... through orderly 
sale of all or part of the principal assets,'' but he follows 
with clear and unambiguous words that meet the test 
of the California statute as extended, and the Utah 
statute as it has existed for years, that: 
''In the event any payments specified to be 
made by my Trustee shall be so reduced or sus-
pended, it is 1ny desire that when funds become 
available, any so resulttng deNciencies in monthly 
payments shall be made up." 
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Thus the will agrees with the California statute that the 
right to receive the fixed sum of $100.00 per month 
vested on the date of testator's death; that if not paid 
then, the sum would have to be made up. And note 
the peculiar language in Seven (k) refers only to ''de-
ficiencies in monthly payments.,., (R. 15) How many 
annuities or legacies called for monthly pa.yments? Only 
two. Mrs. Meyer and the widow. It is clear that the 
testator had in mind provision for Mrs. Meyer ''during 
her lifetime.'' To postpone the vesting or accruing of 
Mrs. Meyer's annuity until such time as the executor 
saw fit to distribute the estate would be catastrophic to 
her age. Attaching conditions tending to ''destroy estates 
are not f.avored in law, and are construed strictly, and 
generally all doubts are resolved against restrictions on 
the use of the property of the grantee." GAFFER'S 
ESTATE 5 NYS 2nd 678. ''Conditions of defeasance, 
never suggested by her brother. 
POINT II 
THE BEQUEST TO MRS. MEYER WAS IN THE TRUE 
NA'TURE OF AN ANNUITY. 
Appellants argue in their Point III that the bequest 
to Mrs. Meyer is not an annuity. The contingencies 
referred to respecting the widow are not .applicable to 
Mrs. Meyer. Counsel predicate their argument that 
''respondents do not have an absolute right that they 
be made up,'' referring to the reduction or suspension 
if funds are not readibly available in respect to selling 
assets at a sacrifice. Judge Tuckett heard the theory 
and was not impressed. 
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At that argument (R. 14) appellants' counsel refer-
red the court to the Utah case of In Re SEARS' 
ESTATE 55 P 83 which no doubt assisted the trial 
court in determining that the bequests were in the nature 
of annuities.. Counsel does not suggest this court now 
consult its own decision, precedent since 1898, and un-
changed. There testator made provision for his wife, 
sister, the latter to get $50.00 per month during her life. 
A nurse was given money '' as soon as there shall be 
sufficient,'' and by the payment of expenses, and the 
two annuities, there was insufficient for the nurse. The 
nurse persuaded the trial court to cut down the sister~ 
but this court reversed, holding: 
''Each of the foregoing bequests constitute 
an annuity, to continue during the life of the 
legatee . . . The record shows ... that the estate 
after payment of the debts, expenses of admini-
stration, and a monthly allowance to the widow, 
which lasted about a year, was well-nigh exhaus-
ted ... that the sister and legatee . . . has received 
nothing out of the estate, although at the time 
of making the decree complained of, 12 months 
had elapsed since the death of testate. It is 
apparent that all the legacies cannot be paid, and 
the question is who is entitled to preference under 
the terms of the will, as between the legatees to 
this controversy? 
''It seems clear that the testator himself 
indicated whoshould receive preference in such 
a contingency . . . Next there is a provision for 
his sister and her children. This is also quite 
natural, because of the tender and affectionate 
feelings which usually exist between brother and 
sister. Then, after those who are entitled to his 
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first and highest consideration have been pro-
vided for ... bequest to the nurse ... it cannot 
be presumed that the testator intended that this 
bequest to a stranger should, under any contin-
gency, receive preference over those made to his 
wife and sister. Such a presumption would be 
opposed to the natural feeling or affection which 
man has for his wife .and next of kin. 
"The bequest to his sister was an annut1ty, 
which commenced at the testator's {jeath while 
the bequest to the nurse was a legacy which w.as 
not due until one year after his death. Rev. St. 
2815 ... ,, 
The will stated that payments would commence with 
the date of testator's death. Pierpont's gift to Mrs. 
Meyer is silent. But that silence does not dispose of 
the case as grounds for this court declaring the gift· 
to be an annuity. The laws of Utah at that time (Rev. 
Stat. Utah No. 2815 was identical to 7 4-3-14 UCA 1953 
and the court found the old statute made out an annuity. 
The fact that the will itself specified the date of death 
for payment is immaterial in view of the Utah statutes. 
In leading California case In Re PLATT'S ESTA·TE, 
131 P2d 825 at 828 the will did not specify the time 
payments were to commence, but that court, along with 
virtually .all others, stated : 
''So as there is no express provision in the 
will as to the date from which payment of income 
shall accrue, under Section 160 of the Probate 
Code the rights of both wife and son to income 
under the trust accrue from the date of the testa-
tor's death." 
In arguing our point number two on .annuities, may 
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we say that implict in the authorities cited in point one 
is the law pertaining to annuities. We advert primarily 
to the arguments of appellants for answer, referring 
the reader to point one for synthesis of the dual question 
of vesting and annuities. The two are closely allied 
in the cruses. 
The prime statutory definition of annuity is in 7 4-
3-1, DCA 1953: 
" ... (3) An annuity is a bequest of -certain 
specified sums periodically; if the fund or pro-
perty out of which they are payable fails, resort 
may be had to the general assets as in case of 
a general legacy.'' 
Counsel refers on page 26 of their brief to the definition 
of annuity as it pertains to insurance. That is imperti-
nent. We deal only with the probate definition, quoted 
immediately above, it having but one prime requisite: 
that is for a certain specified sum, periodically. The will 
at paragr.aph 7 (i) is certain. It specifies $100.00 per 
month "during her lifetime.'' It also goes further than 
need be, under the Utah statute, and requires the inva-
sion of principle if income is insufficient. Thus the 
statute of Utah just quoted, as to its final clause, is 
not even needed to give certainty. 
Counsel goes to p.aragraph Seven (k) to create 
doubt as to certainty, and even argues on page 30 of 
their brief that Mrs. Meyer could not sue to force a 
sale. -'Suffice it to say she did not. She did not presume 
to rifle the estate, not force uneconomic sacrifice. She 
waited patiently, only to have her w.aiting rewarded 
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with a prolonged and costly defense of her absolute 
rights, once the estate was liquidated and in a position 
to distribute. It was wise for the testator Pierpont to 
instruct no haste in marshalling the assets. But the 
intent is absolute and clear in the will: first, that Mrs. 
Meyer was to get under 7 (i) a sum certain during her 
lifetime; and second, that if in prudence, monthly pay-
ments were reduced or suspended, they shall be made 
up, in 7 (k). It is impossible to mistake the construction. 
It is clear. It was not drawn by amateur counsel. Had 
the draftsman intended to postpone payments to Mrs. 
Meyer, it would have been easy to carve out an excep-
tion for the then existing pertinent statute, 74-3-14 UCA 
1953, but all that appears is the wisdom of careful 
liquidation, holding out the instruction that if "pay-
ments required to be made" were suspended, they shall 
be made up. Again note that 7 (k) only refers to 
"monthly payments" and Mrs. Meyer and the widow 
are the only set up for monthly payments. When the 
construction given an instrument by a trial court appe.ars 
to be resonable and consistent with the intent of the 
party making it, appellate courts will not substitute 
another interpretation even though it seems tenable. 
Here, any substitute interpretation would be stretching 
intent, and would be villainous. 
Appellants say Mrs. l\1:eyer would have no remed~r 
had she sued for a more speedy liquidation and payment 
to her of the annuity. They argue ''respondents do 
not have an absolute right that they (payments) be made 
up.,_, (p 30, their brief) It may be only a qualified 
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right, qualified only by the caution of orderly liquida-
tion. We do not split hairs. Had the trustee or the 
probate court been slothful in its liquidation, and under-
taken to unnecessarily prolong that process, certainly 
this court under its rules concerning Extraordinary 
Writs would have the power to step in and discipline; 
the rights of Mrs. Meyer were qualified only to the 
extent of waiting for sales, conversion into cash without 
sacrifice. This is sensible, but is no grounds for appel-
lants arguing the need for .an ''absolute right'' to receive 
the annuity. This court did not mind finding In Re 
SEARS' ESTATE, supra, that the sister, who had not 
been paid anything within a year of the testator's death, 
still had a vested right to receive the annuity as of 
the date of testator's death. It has been unfair for the 
trustee to so long withold the annuity, since it had the 
funds. The trustee has yielded to the pressures of the 
residuary legatees ; instead of remaining neutral .as a 
trustee should, it has taken sides with the grand children 
and others, remote from the testator's sister, whom 
Mr. Pierpont had maintained, and wanted to continue 
to help during her old .age. As to Mrs. Meyer, there 
never has been a legitimate controversy 
·The complete answer to appellant's argument con-
cerning a right to compel payment before distribution 
is set forth In Re MARRE 'S ESTATE, 114 P2d 591 at 
590 under 11-13 sub heads, quoted hereinbefore. Space 
does not allow repetition. (see pageS ____ of this brief) 
~ . ,, / 
' ,.<' 
Appellants' reference to precatory words in para-
graph 7 (k) is specious. The whole idea of suspension 
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or reduction of monthly payments is predicated on the 
precatory use of the word "may" on the fourth line of 
7(k). Note that on line 2 thereof, the testator has used 
the mandatory, unprecatory words "payments required." 
This proves the stronger intent in par.a:graph 7 (i) 
where the strongest word in the law, "shall" is unquali-
fied, as to the intent that his sister shall receive $100 
per month during her lifetime. Precatory words may be 
found in 7 (k), but they relate to the discretion of 
postponement, not the ultimate right of Mrs. Meyer 
to receive. " ... resulting deficiencies in monthly pay-
ments shall be made up,'' are anything but precatory -
they manifest a determination to maintain those of his 
loved-ones who had monthly payments, not those that 
came after! Certainly the trustee had qualified right 
to postpone payments; but with the qualified right rode 
the unqualified right to have the difficiencies ''made up.'' 
This type of a will is to be encouraged, but certainly 
it would make bad law for this court to graft into 
precedent law the hair-splitting and ambiguity implicit 
in such contention of appellants. 
Appellants are confused. The best way to unconfuse 
them is for this court to follow the California Supreme 
Court In Re MARRE'S EST.&TE, supra, 114 P2 586 and 
since followed widely. We have quoted earlier in this 
brief from that excellent decision. In that case it was 
likewise .argued that annuities were not created by the 
will because no date of ·commencing payments was stated. 
The court said : 
"'The absence of an express direction that the 
payments were to accrue from the date of her 
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death does not establish conclusively that the 
testatrix had no such intent .... The terms of the 
will clearly indicated that this trust was created 
for the specific purpose of providing maintenance 
and support for the testatrix' grandson ... In-
deed, if the will itself did not refer to this bequest 
as a trust for maintenance and support, the 
surrounding facts and circumstances would com-
pel that conclusion.'' 
WOODLEY v. WOODLEY 117 P2d 722, cited by 
appellants at page 29, their brief, relates to an annuity 
which is a charge on land, .and not applicable. Besides 
it is a lower court decision; it does not help or hurt 
the respondent's position at bar otherwise than to dig-
nify the argument that annuitants have vested rights that 
may he vindicated in the courts. 
Appellants cite 95 C. J. S. 803 on precatory words. 
Note the same authority at page 800, keeping in mind 
that the precatory words, if such they be in 7 (k) of the 
will, .are addressed to the trustee, not to the right of 
Mrs. Meyer to receive monthly payments. Her right 
is preserved by the words ' (payments required to be 
made'' on the second line thereof. The precatory words 
refer to the method of liquidation; they are suggestions 
to the trustee, and in no way unvest !irs. !ieyer. Line 
13 of 7 (k) illuminates again the intent that the trustee 
shall 1neet the payinents specified in this ·will." 
Appellants' brief has not completely leveled with 
the court on page 32, line 3 of its atte1npt to elucidate 
the precatory. It is singular that the most important 
word in the paragraph - "shall was ommitted. It is 
this word that refers to the vested right of the annui-
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tants. Possibly counsel did not realize it was there. 
He assumes that in its place a word like "may" exists. 
Not so. His argument falls with his failure to find the 
word! Substitute a precatory word in its place, and 
the finding this court must affirm is self evident. 
In re PIT·TOCK 'S WILL cited at page 33 of appel-
lants' brief is beside the point. 
Counsel trifle with the manner of the lower court 
in finding the bequests are '' in the nature of annuities.'' 
The learned trial judge used a common manner of 
speech, writing. Please notice how the California court 
uses the same expression on line 18 of p:age 590 In Re 
MARRE'S ESTATE, 114 P2d 591, supra. Counsel quib-
bles. 
7 4-2-25 UCA 1953 raises a presumption that Mrs. 
Meyer had a vested right to receive her annuity as of 
the time of death. At page 36 of their brief, appellants 
admit respondent Meyer is supported by a presumption. 
Appellants have utterly failed to rebut the presumption. 
The will itself confirms tha.t the presumption is wholly 
warranted. 
The only discretion trustee had, in respect to re-
spondent Mrs. Meyer, was to take precautions in an 
orderly liquidation. All of their talk on this subject is 
unworthy. There is no discretion when Mr. Pierpont 
said ''shall be made up,'' not may. 
Finally, appellants' brief adverts on page 37 to the 
duty of the trustee to pay the annuity to Mrs. Meyer 
or to her estate. Had she died prior to distribution, 
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counsel did not say her estate could not collect ! The 
authorities treated herein established the vesting as of 
date of testator's death and preserved the rights that 
Mrs. Meyer's estate could realize. Mr. Pierpont recog-
nized this by paragraph 9 of the will. That further 
proves his intent to take care of her during her lifetime. 
It was and is a vested right that cannot be postponed. 
Only the manner of making payment is affected by par-a-
graph 7 (k), not the right. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING INTEREST 
SHOULD BE PAID FROM DATE OF DEATH. 
Appellants' counsel argue on page 38 of their brief 
that the court erred in affixing interest on the annuity. 
In that connection, the clear error of appellants is 
exhibited. The brief say at page 38: 
''In any event, the award is erroneous as 
to any payments for the period prior to August 
29, 1957, since it is within the discretion of the 
trustee as to whether any such payments shall 
be made up." 
Nothing could he further frmn the truth. 
To get at this question, as .a matter of law, which 
appellants have skirted, citing no authority, let us look 
at the cases on interest accruing on annuities. The 
authorities we are concearned with all .agree that interest 
accrues on an annuity of this kind! 
The learned trial court required the payment of 
interest to Mrs. Meyer, and presumably he relied on the 
lTtah statute, and the general law. He was right. What 
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is the difference between an annuity and a legacy? All 
legacies are not annuities, but all annuities are legacies! 
Hence, when the Utah statute expressly reaches out 
and employs the language of "legacies for maintenance" 
Mrs. Meyer is clearly within the Utah statute. But we 
do not rely on the Utah statute alone. 
Note what 2 Am J ur. 829 No. 25 has to say about Interest 
upon arrearages : 
"In this country the weight of authority sup-
ports the ·conclusion that interest upon arrear ages 
of annuities is recoverable from the time the 
installments of the annuity becomes due and pay-
able.'' 
The statute of Utah requires the payment of interest. 
74-3-15 says: 
"Legacies bear interest from the time when 
they are due and payable, except that legacies for 
maintenance or to the testator's widow, bear in-
terest from the testator's decease." 
Mrs. Meyer was given a legacy in the nature of an an-
nuity. It was clearly for "maintenance." All inferences 
point positively in that direction. This court is bound 
to accept the proffer of proof that for 18 to 20 months 
before his death, he maintained her with payments of at 
least $100 per month. (Tr. 20) Is a legacy, as used in 
74-3-15 an annuity~ Certainly it is. Bouvier defines a 
legacy to be "A gift of personal property by last will 
and testament. A gift or disposition in one's favor by a 
last will. The term is more commonly applied to a be-
quest of money or chattels ... A direction to the executor 
to support and maintain a person during his life gives 
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him a legacy." There can be no doubt but that an annuity 
is within the generic term used in 74-3-15, thus requiring 
the payment of interest, and from the time they are due 
and payable, which is in 74-3-14 UGA 1953: "Annuities 
commence at the testator's decease." The trial court was 
aware of this and hence made his decree accordingly. This 
should by all means be affirmed. 
Note that the California statute since 1931 has read: 
"General pecuniary legacies, if not paid prior 
to the first anniversary of the testator's death, 
bear interest thereafter at the rate of 4% per 
annum. Annuities commence at the testator's 
death and are due at the end of the annual, month-
ly or other specified period. Whenever an an-
nuitant, legatee of a legacy for maintenance or 
beneficiary of a trust may be entitled to periodic 
payments or trust income commencing at the 
testator's death, he shall be entitled to interest at 
4% per annum on the amount of any unpaid ac-
cumulations of such payments or income held by 
the executor or administrator on each anniver-
sary of the decedent's death, computed from the 
date of such anniversary." (See legislative his-
tory of section.) 
Deering's Calif. Codes, Probate, 333 No. 162. 
California codified its practice in the courts. Utah's 
statutes are not in conflict, and are in effect to the same 
effect, without the interest rate stated. 
When interest attaches by statute, that of itself 
proves the vesting of the legacy, annuity. 
Please refer to Jarman on Wills, 7th Ed., vol. 2, page 
1108 for reference to the English authorities. Lord Har-
wicke is there quoted as saying that "where the accumu-
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lation of arrears has been occasioned by the misconduct 
of the party bound to pay" that interest should always 
accrue. In that same work, Jarman at page 1024 speci-
fies the different kinds of legacies, helpful in classifica-
tion in this case. That eminent authority states, at page 
1107 of that work, respecting the date annuities begin to 
be payable: 
"The general rule is that an annuity given by 
will is to commence from the date of the testator's 
death; that is to say, if no time for payment is 
fixed, the first payment is to be made at the ex-
piration of one year from the testator's death, but 
if the testator directs that the annuity shall be 
paid, say, monthly, the first payment is to be made 
at the end of a month after the testator's death.'' 
2 Jarman, Wills, 7th Ed. 1107. 
The Utah statute has picked up this old and ancient rule. 
That we are dealing with an ancient and established 
precedent, see the annotation at 10 ANNO. CASES, 339 
with this statement, backed up by a host of authorities: 
"By the weight of authority, interest upon 
the arrearages of annuities is recoverable. Thus it 
has been held that interest is recoverable from 
the time the installments of the annuity become 
due and payable ... Where an annuity has been 
given for the support and maintenance of the an-
nuitant, interest upon the arrearages must be al-
lowed. 
Let it be observed that Mrs. Meyer has always con-
tended for interest, and is not guilty of laches. See her 
pleadings at pages 347, 367 of the record. 
The Supreme Court of California in re HUBBELL'S 
ESTATE, 1932, 15 P. 2d 503 observed: 
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"We are inclined to the view that interest is 
due on a legacy, not as a penalty for nonpayment 
or default in payment, but as a part of or and 
accretion to the legacy itself." 
To apply such a rule of reason in this case does no injury 
to anyone because the trustees has had the corpus of the 
estate out at interest for the benefit of all of the residu-
ary legatees. To deprive Mrs. Meyer of her just share 
of that interest would be inequitable, and benefit those 
whom Mr. Pierpont did not intend to favor, as his sister's 
loss. His intent to make up any delayed payment is proof. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Re SEAR'S ESTATE, 
55 P 83 found that 
"The bequest to his sister was an annuity 
which commenced at the testator's death ... " 
Thus, under 7 4-3-15-U·CA 1953, interest had to accrue 
from date of death of Mr. Pierpont. 
This court In Re LOWE'S ESTATE, 249 P. 128 
found that 
" . . all testamentary dispositions are pre-
sumed to vest at the testator's death." 
There is no other answer. 
In Re MARRE'S ESTATE, 114 P2 591 gives a 
strong treatment on the subject, finding that interest 
must be paid on "legacies for support and maintenance~' 
such as we have here. 
In re PLATT'S ESTATE, 131 P2 825 the California 
court in that classic leading case holds : 
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"Interest, when payable upon a legacy, is a 
part of or an accretion to the legacy itself. (cases) 
Legacies for maintenance or to the testator's 
widow bear interest from the testator's death; all 
other legacies are due one year after the testator's 
death and bear interest from that time. (code & 
case) Under this rule, the income which accrued 
to the wife during the period between the date of 
death and the date of distribution bears interest 
from the date such income was received by the 
executors." 
The RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS, second, revised 
edition, at topic 234 is illuminatative on the question of 
interest. 
The strongest argument in favor of allowing interest 
is in the will itself. By paragraph 7 (i) the testator showed 
that he did not rely on income alone but of the corpus of 
his property as grounds for payment to Mrs. Meyer. He 
stated clearly that if the income was insufficient, then the 
principle should be invaded so as to get her required 
payment of $100 per month during her lifetime. 7 (k) 
wherein payments to be paid up if suspended, shows the 
clear intent that she should have the sum certain. If 
this court continues to adhere to its rule that annuities 
vest as of the time of death of the testator, then the 
requirement of the trustee to pay the legal rate of 6% 
interest from date of death must apply. That counsel 
argues that there was no income for a time in the estate 
is inapplicable because of the mandate to pay the $100 
from corpus if income was not sufficient. This puts the 
right to receive interest on the footing of any other obli-
gation in Utah that goes unpaid. We deal here with a 
legacy in the nature of an annuity, and the probate stat-
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utes require payment of interest from the time when they 
are due. (74-3-15 UCA 1953) There can be no escape. 
Appellants predicate their entire argument against 
interest on their being a discretion to pay the annuity 
if and when the probate was concluded. This is falacious, 
as has been argued in the main part of this brief. If the 
sum provided in the will vested at time of death, interest 
commences then. The trial court so found and computed. 
It was right. 
CONCLUSION 
Mrs. Ella Meyer trusts that this court will affirm 
the lower court, and make available to her while she is 
yet alive, the gift with interest, bestowed by her loving 
brother. She will not be long with us, but her rights are 
real and vested. May they be vindicated in the name of 
good law for the books. 
415 So. 2nd East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Respectfully, 
WARWICK C. LAMOREAUX 
ALLEN HOWE, 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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